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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
EDNA L. KOPP,

Plaintiff-Respondent,
vs.

SALT LAKE CITY, a Municipal
Corporation of the State of Utah,

Case No.
12999

Defcndant-Appellant.

Brief of Defendant-Appellant
Salt Lake City Corporation

NATURE OF CASE
This is an appeal from an Order of the District
Court of the Third Judicial District, in and for Salt
Lake County, sustaining and affirming an Order of the
Industrial Commission of the State of Utah, Anti-Discrimination Division, which Order awarded the Plaintiff-Respondent a judgment for back pay based upon a
finding of discrimination because of sex pursuant to the
1

Utah Anti-Discrimination Act, Section 34-35-1, et seq.,
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended. This appeal is
for the purposes of interpreting the provisions of that
Act.

DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
Proceedings were had before the Anti-Discrimination Division of the Industrial Commission of the State
of Utah, and that body found that discrimination had occurred and awarded Plaintiff-Respondent a judgment
for back-pay in an amount equaling the difference in
salary actually paid to the Plaintiff-Respondent and
that amount paid a police officer at the lowest Civil
Service grade level, for the period from July l, 1965,
(the date the Anti-Discrimination Act took effect) until January 15, 1970, (the date the Defendant-Appellant,
by ordinance, created the new position of "dispatcher.")
Defendant-Appellant appealed to the Third Judicial
Court and that Court sustained the finding and upheld
the Order of the Industrial Commission.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant-Appellant seeks to have this court reverse the judgment of the lower court and the finding
and order of the Industrial Commission.
2

STATE~IENT

OF FACTS

Plaintiff-Respondent, hereinafter referred to as
Plaintiff, was employed by Defendant-Appellant, hereinafter referred to as Defendant, on or about December
7, 1961, as a clerk typist in the Salt Lake City Police
Department. On or about May 15, 1962, Plaintiff was
then assigned to the Dispatch Office of said Police Department to act as a radio operator, which was generally
referred to as a "dispatcher." Plaintiff worked along side
of male police officers who were also referred to as "dispatchers," who handled the incoming phone calls, decided whether or not it was a police matter, evaluated
the information and made a decision as to what action
should be taken. The information was then given to the
female to broadcast to the field officers. At some point
in time, which point of time was not very well established
in the record, Plaintiff began, on her own initiative, to
assume the task, in times of need, of answering the phone
and helping out the police officers with their job. Gradually, Plaintiff began assuming more of the police officers' work until at the time of the filing of the complaint
in this matter, Plaintiff was answering the phone when
there was an overload of calls coming in to the dispatch
off ice, when a police officer was not available because of
sickness, vacation, etc. On the other hand, police officers
operated the radio only when a female employee was not
there, such as when she was out for lunch, home ill, vacations, or such. On or about November 21, 1969, Plaintiff
filed a complaint with the Industrial Commission charging discrimination because of sex.
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STATEMENT OF POINTS
The Industrial Commission erred in their finding of
discrimination as well as its Order awarding back pay to
the Plaintiff from July 1, 1965, to January 15, 1970,
and the District Court erred in sustaining that erroneous
finding and order for the following reasons:
POINT I
FOR A CLAIM OF DISCRilHINATION BECAUSE OF SEX TO BE SUSTAINED, THE
PLAINTIFF MUST, IN FACT, BE EMPLOYED ON THE SAME JOB OR IN THE SAME
JOB CLASSIFICATION OR POSITION, AND
IN THIS CASE, THE PLAINTIFF WAS NOT
EMPLOYED IN THE SAME JOB, JOB CLASSIFICATION OR POSITION.
The statute in question, since this is a question of
first impression, has no legal precedence for guidance in
the interpretation of that Act. The case before the Court
at this time is a case of first impression. However, the
Equal Pay Act of 1963, 29 U.S.C. 206 ( d) ( 1), is similar
in nature to the Utah Anti-Discrimination Act, Title 34,
Chapter 35, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended.
Therefore, cases decided under the Equal Pay Act can
afford some guide line for the interpretation of the Utah
Act. One difference between these acts, which should be
noted at the outset is that the Federal Act provides for
equal pay for equal work, while the Utah Act requires
that an employee must be employed on the same job, job
4

classification or position to be filled or created; must be
discriminated against in matters of compensation; and
that discrimination must be due solely to one of the
enumerated reasons, one of which is sex, before the requirement of equal pay must be met. The Federal Statute provides that an employer may not discriminate.
"Between employees on the basis of sex, by
paying wages to employees ... at a rate less than
the rate at which he pays wages to employees of
the opposite sex ... for equal skill, effort, and
responsibility, and which are performed under
similar working conditions, except where such
payment is made pursuant to ... a differential
based; on an;lj factor other than sea' . ... " 29 U.S.C.
206 ( d) (I) (Emphasis added)
The Utah Anti-Discrimination Act provides:
" (I) It shall be a discriminatory or unfair employment practice:
(a) For an employer to refuse to hire, to
discharge, to promote or demot<~, or
to discriminate in matters of compensation against any person otherwise qualified, because of . . . sex
... and no applicant or candidate for
any job or position shall be deemed
'otherwise qualified' unless he or she
possesses the education, training,
ability, moral character, integrity,
disposition to work, adherence to
reasonable rules and regulations,
and other qualifications required by
an employer for any particular job,
}ob classification or position to be
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filled or created." Sec. 34-35-6, Utah
Code Annotated, 1953, as amended.
(Emphasis added)

It is definite in the case at bar that the men the

~

Plaintiff has worked along side of were not in the same
job classification with her. She had been classified as a
"clerk typist" and was subsequently reclassified as a
"dispatcher," while the men were, with the exception of
one, police officers and had as their Civil Service designation either patrolmen, lst, 2nd, 3rd, 4th or Sargeants.
The one who was not classified as a police officer had a
classification of "radio operator." Since the job classifications were not the same, the only question left to be
answered is whether or not the Plaintiff and the men
performed, in fact, the same "job" or performed within
the same "position."
The test which should be applied in order to determine whether two jobs or two positions are the same or
not is that the jobs, as a whole, should be viewed over the
entire work cycle and not by taking isolated incidences
into consideration. Wirtz v. Rainbo Baking Co., 303 F.
Supp. 1049 (1967); Wirtz v .Basic, Inc., 250 F.Supp.
786 ( 1966). It is the substantiality test which is applied
in the cases decided under the Federal Act, i.e., whether
differences in the job are merely incidental, insignificant
and inconsequential, or whether they are so substantial
as to justify a clifferent classification, therefore, considered as different jobs. This means that persons performing some functions which are the same, but where
other functions are different, this does not constitute the
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same job unless those additional functions are incidental,
insignificant and inconsequential. The court in Shultz v.
Brookhaven General Hospital, 305 F.Supp. 424 (1969),
at page 426, stated the proposition thusly:
"In determining a violation of the Equal Pay
Act of 1963, the requirements of the particular
job should be compared rather than the skill of
individual employees, or their previous training
and experience.
"'Equal' as used in the Equal Pay Act of 1963
does not mean identical and insubstantial differences in the skill, effort and responsibility requirements of particular jobs should be ignored.
The job requirements are to be viewed as a
whole." (Emphasis added)
In Shultz v. Wheaton Glass Co., 421 F.2d 259
( 1970), the court, at page 265, said:
"Congress in prescribing 'equal' work did not
require that the jobs be identical but only that
they must be substantially equal."
The Utah Legislature did not see fit to enact this
same provision, that is, equal pay for equal work, which
the courts interpret as requiring "substantially equal"
jobs. Under the Utah Act an employee must be employed on the same "job, job classification or position to
be filled or created." Thus, under the Utah law it would
appear there is not the leeway that is given under the
Federal Act for an employee to be in a different job and
still be entitled to receive the pay of another job because
it is "substanttially equal." This would mean that where
there are two different jobs, even though some functions
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are performed which are the same, the Utah Act would
not require that both jobs be paid the same amount.
Thus, under the Utah Act it is urged that the jobs must
be identical in nature before a discrimination charge will
be sustained.
The Wheaton Glass Co. case was appealed from the
lower court and on appeal the decision of the lower court
was reversed. In the lower court, the cases was entitled,
Wirtz v. Wheaton Glass Co., 284 F.Supp. 23 ( 1968). In
that case, the lower court said that there might be economic reasons for having men and women performing
the same functions at times and still allow a higher wage
paid to the men because of added responsibility. The
court acknowledged that these economic reasons would
allow a finding that any discrimination which had occurred would not then be because of sex. In that case,
men and women were performing the identical task 82%
of the time on a job which was classified as "selectorpackers." The job of selector-packers was to inspect the
bottles for any defects as they emerged on a conveyor
from the oven. The defective products were discarded
while those that met the standards were packaged. The
Company had another category of employees known as
"snap-up boys," who crated and moved the bottles and
generally functioned as handymen, sweeping, cleaning
and performing other unskilled miscellaneous tasks. The
male selector-packers spent about 18% of their time
performing sixteen additional tasks, which tasks were
performed by the snap-up boys on a full time basis. The
lower court held that spending 18% of their time doing
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other tasks was significant enough to require that the
finding of the job of the male selector-packers was not
even substantially equal with the job the female selectorpackers performed. In that case the lower court stated:
"The basic issue, of course, requires the determination of whether there is a difference, in fact,
between male and female performance in the job
of selector-packers and if so, whether such difference is essential and substantial enough to constitute a realistic ecorwmic basis for disparity and
wage rates. However, if such difference is merely
incidental, insignificant and unsubstantial to the
performance of the principal task of the department in question, then it must be concluded that it
is more artificial than real, leaving sex as the only
realistic and distinctive basis for the wage dispartiy, contrary to the Act." Wirtz v. Wheaton
Glass Co., supra, at page 31. (Emphasis added)
In stating that the additional functions performed by the
men constituted a separate job, and, therefore, allowed a
disparity in pay, the court observed:
"As heretofore stated, the declared purpose of
the Act was to eliminate discrimination in wage
payments to employees on the basis of sex where
equal work was being performed by both men
and women under the same or similar working
conditions. However, if the differential is based
upon any other factor other than sex, then that
differential is beyond the reach of the Act."
Wirtz v. Wheaton Glass Co., supra, at page 31.
As in the Federal Act, the Utah Act should likewise be interpreted to mean that if the disparity in the
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rate of pay is based upon any other factor other than sex,
such disparity is "beyond the reach of the Act."
There must be allowed a discretion to the employer to evaluate the employee's work and to set wages
accordingly.
"For as was said by Congressman Goodell, in
speaking of the intent of the Act, '(W) e want
the private enterprise system, employer and employee and a union, if there is a union, to have a
maximum degree of discretion in working out the
evaluation of the employee's work and how much
he should be paid for it ... [sex] is the sole factor
that we are insisting as a restriction.' " Wirtz v.
Wheaton Glass Co., supra, at page 32.
"The Act was never intended to circumscribe
an employer's appraisal or determination of the
need and utilitarian value of an employee's performance. What was intended was prohibition of
specious distinction based upon sex alone, all
other things being equal." Wirtz v. Wheaton
Glass Co., supra, at page 33.
Hence, in order to have a claim for discrimination, all
other factors, other than sex, must be the same. Under
the Utah Act this requires that male and female must be
on the same job, job classification or position to be filled
or created.
"True, in the assembly line phase of selecting
and packing both men and women performed
identical functions. If nothing more remained to
be done, and in fact was not done, then it would
seem clear that within the confines of this work
function, they would be performing equal work
for which equal pay should be mandated. But the
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evidence demonstrates that such is not the case.
:For the job of the male neither begins nor ends
with the particular performance, as it does with
the female. It is the extended scope of the male's
job requirements, coupled with other distinguishing factors, heretofore set forth, and their cumulative effect upon which focus must be directed.
So viewed, the proof amply demonstrates that
men and women do not perform equal work under
similar conditions within the intent of the Act. To
the contrary, men are required to exert additional
effort, to possess additional skill and to have additional responsibility, which frequently are performed and discharged under the ever changing
demands of working conditions, dissimilar to
those prevailing for women." Wirtz v. Wheaton
Glass Co., supra, at page 34.
This case, as mentioned, was reversed by the Appellate
Court, but not because of auy error the lower court made
by its decision that the additional functions performed
by the men, constituting only about 18% of their time,
made the jobs different. One reason the decision was
overturned was because:
"While all male selector-packers received the
higher rate of pay, there is no finding that all of
them are either available for or actually perform
'snap-up boys' work." Sh11Hz v. Wheaton G'-ass
Co., supra, at page 264.
The second reason was that the snap-up boys were paid
only two cents ( 2c) an hour more than the female selector-packers, while the male selector-packers were paid
211/2 cents more than the women.
11

"On its face the record presents the incongruity
because male selector-packers spent a relatively small portion of their time doing the work
of snap-up boys whose houriy rate of pay is $2.16,
they are paid $2.355 per hour for their own work
while female selector-packers receive only $2.14:
This immediately casts doubt on any contention
that the difference in the work done by male and
female selector-packers, which amounts substantially to what the snap-up boys do, is of itself
enough to explain the difference in the rate of
pay for male and female selector-packers on
grounds other than sex." Shultz v. Wheaton
Glass Co., supra, at page 262.
t~at

In Shultz v. Victoria Nat'l Bank, 240 F.2d 648
( 1910), the facts were that women were performing the
exact same job as the men but being paid less. The defendant claimed that the men were on a training program which the court said was in practice, sporadic, unspecific, unpredictable, and unplanned and, therefore,
did not comply with the exemption. The Victoria National Bank case stands for the proposition that, under
the Federal Act, the defendant has the burden of proof
as to whether one of the exemptions given under that
Act is applied to his case. The Federal Equal Pay Act
provides for several exemptions which allow a disparity
in wages if the payments are made pursuant to ( 1) a
seniority system, ( 2) a merit system, ( 3) a system which
measures earnings by quality or quantity, or ( 4) a difference based on any other factor other than sex. The
Utah Act does not provide for these exemptions. Therefore, the entire burden is upon the Plaintiff to establish
that she is employed on the same job, or is classified in
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the same job classification or position; that she has been
discriminated against; and that discrimination has, as its
sole basis, the reason of her being of a different sex/. The
Industrial Commission e~red in applying the standards
of the Federal Act requiring Defendant to establish that
one of these exceptions of the Federal Act applied to
this case. Even if it were true that in the case at bar the
defendant must prove that it comes within one of the
exceptions, this we have done, The disparity at hand is
simply and purely for reasons other than sex. The first
is, as previously discussed, because the two jobs in the
dispatch office are not the same "job, job classification,
or position to be filled or created." See Defendant's
Memorandum filed before the Industrial Commission of
Utah, designated in the record of the Industrial Commission as Item 284; the same is hereby made a part of
this Brief and incorporated herein by reference. Secondly, the difference in pay is because of additional
qualifications which the men possess so far as "education, training and ability," provided by their basic training, inservice training and their actual experience out in
the field. It is for these reasons and these reasons alone,
that the men are being paid at a higher rate of pay. When
women perform the same job for Salt Lake City as do
men, they are paid the same wages, e.g., Salt Lake City
has two police women and they are paid on the same pay
scale as police men.

Wirtz v. Dennison Mfg. Co., 265 F.Supp. 787
( 1967), is also an interesting case regarding what constitutes a separate job or an unequal job under the Fed-
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eral Equal Pay Act. Again, in that case the men and the
women worked on the same machines doing exactly the
same job, but the men had the additional job of changing
over their machines when starting work on a new order
and also making repairs and adjustments on their machines when necessary, as well as getting their own material to work on and moving their finished work to the
shipping areas. Despite the fact that these additional
functions required only about 10% of the male operator's time, the court held that these two jobs were not
substantially equal. In discussing what the real issue in
this case was, the court said:
"The real issue is whether these differences are,
as plaintiff contends, merely incidental, insignificant and inconsequential, or whether, as defendant argues, they are so substantial as to justify the pay differential which existed." Wirtz v.
Dennison Mfg. Co., supra, at page 789.
The court held these additional tasks to be different
and substantial ones; thus, justifying the finding that
these jobs were unequal.
"The court finds that the difference was a substantial one. The men on the third shift had to
possess skills not required by the women operators. Of course, they were not required to be experienced machinists, but they did have to possess
a significant degree of mechanical skill and ability in order to change o_ver their machines from
job to job and to repair them when necessary.
They also had to perform the task of m.oving their
own materials to and from their machmes, a task
which required physical effort which the women
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operators who testified said they could not or
would not perform. These activities, while they
may not have taken up more than 10% of the
men's working time, were an essential part of
their task which they had to perform on every
working night and without which the job could
not have been performed. They were clearly far
more than incidental or occasional extra work."
Wirtz v. Dennison Mfg. Co., supra ,at page 789.
Here, where the men performed the same job as the women performed ninety percent of the time, but had additional tasks which took only ten percent of their time, the
court said there was nothing to show that sex discrimination was involved in this instance.
"In the situation here invo]ved, there is nothing to
show that sex discrimination played any part in
determining the pay rate on the third shift (on
which shift only men operated the machines). Defendant's action was clearly justified by other
adequate motives of an economic nature." Wirtz
v. Dennison Mfg. Co., supra, at page 790.
In the case at bar, we have the exact opposite
situation as was found in the Federal cases heretofore
referred to. Rather than the women performing the
identical job with the males a great majority of the
time the Plaintiff in this case performed as a basic function a separate job from the males and only a small portion of the time was spent doing the same job as the
males. In the dispatch office at the Police Department
there are two separate jobs with the basic functions of the
women being the task of operating the radio, while the
basic function of the men is that of handling the incom-
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ing calls, evaluating them, making decisions and directing what action is to be taken in response to these calls.
There is some overlapping of responsibilities in that the
women perform the same functions as do the men; however, they do not perform these same functions to exactly
the same extent as do the men, nor do they perform
these functions anywhere near the length of time the
men do. The women perform these same functions only
when there is no man available because of illness, holidays or vacations; or when there is an overload of incoming calls.
Merely because a person replaces another for periods
of time or merely assists performing functions for that
other person does not mean that he or she is entitled to
the pay of that job. In Wirtz v. Rainha Baking Co.,
303 F.Supp. 1049 (1967) , 1the court said that a person
working only a part of the time on a different job does
not entitle that person to the pay of that job for the
entire period. The court said that:
"The fact that one of the men replaces the
truck-loader one day a week is not a justification
for paying him the entire week at a wage rate
higher than that paid to women." Wirtz v. Rainbo
Baking Co., 303 F.Supp. 1049. (1967), at page
1052.

The second basis for discrimination in the case at
hand is the training, ability, and experience of the men
as opposed to that of the Plaintiff. The Statute contemplates that persons possessing greater "education,
training, ability, moral character, integrity, disposition
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to work, adherence to reasonable rules and regulations
and other qualifications required by an employer," may
be classified at a higher rate of pay. It is because of
this additional training and ability that the men working
in the dispatch office had the basic responsibility of
handling the incoming calls and making decisions as
to how to respond to them, and it is because of this additional training and ability that they were paid more
and not because of any discrimination having as its
basis sex. Persons having greater training and ability
working within the dispatch office are by virtue of that
additional training and ability of greater value to the
Defendant. It would be economically unfeasible for
the Defendant to have had an additional man on duty
to handle peak load periods or in the event of illness or
vacations; hence, it was for this reason that the women
were allowed to help out during these periods of time.

POINT II
THE PLAINTIFF IN THE INSTANT CASE
WAS NOT "OTHERWISE QUALIFIED" BECAUSE SHE DOES NOT POSSESS THE EDUCATION, TRAINING, ABILITY AND OTHER
QUALIFICATIONS REQUIRED BY HER EMPLOYER FOR THE POSITION OF POLICE
OFFICER.
The Statute is clear that a person must possess the
education, training, ability and any other qualifications
required by the employer in order to be "otherwise
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qualified" for any job, job classification or position to
be filled or created. The pay which the Plaintiff is
seeking is that of a police officer and in most instances
she is seeking the salary of a patrolman first class. In
order to gain that classification it is required that police
officers pass a test to become patrolman fourth grade
as well as having special training and education and
specialized courses, such as, hand-to-hand combat, training in the use of various weapons, riot-control training,
first aid and many more. A patrolman must also pass a
test for each promotion, i.e., a test for advancement
to patrolman third grade, one for advancement to
second grade, and one for advancement to first grade.
Further, in-service training is required each year. The
Plaintiff had one day of formal class training while on
her job for eight and one-half ( 81/z) years and has
never taken a test for any advancement; therefore, she
does not possess the education, training, ability and
other qualifications required by her employer, hence,
is not "otherwise qualified" as defined by the Statute
for the job of patrolman.
The court in Detective Endowment Ass'n Police
Dept. v. Leary, 320 N.Y.S. 2d 253 ( 1971), held that the
police commissioner had the right to assign patrolmen
to perform duties of detectives for an extended period
of time without receiving the higher pay of detectives.
The court said that,
"The assignment of a patrolman to the Detective Division does not involve the transfer to a position requiring an examination or involving tests
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or qualifi~ations different from or higher than
those reqmred for the position of patrolman. The
assignment of patrolman to any bureau of the
Police Department does not change the patrolman's Civil Service status."
Further, the court said that, "[T]he designation of the
patrolman as detective is wholly within the discretion
of the police commissioner and may be revoked at his
pleasure."
As in that case, the transfer of the Plaintiff to the
dispatch office in the instant case was not one requiring
a test or qualifications different from or higher than
the lower classification of clerk typist, so in the instant
case, the Chief of Police had the right to transfer clerks
into the dispatch office "by assignment only" without
the requirement of testing and promotion.
The Civil Service Commission established the classification of employees and this classification requires,
upon hiring or promotion a different set of prerequisites,
i.e., physical and mental testing, police training, both
basic and in-service training, and different duties for
each classification. No attack on the classification was
made by the Plaintiff in the instant case. Unless the
Civil Service Commission acted arbitrarily in its classification, a court should not interfere therewith. The
question then comes down to, "Did the Plaintiff meet
the requirements of the classification she is seeking the
pay for?" If not, she is not entitled to the pay of that
classification.
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Merely because some duties may be performed
by persons who are within two different pay classifications does not mean that they are entitled to the same
pay.
In Eley v. Cahill, 126 Ill.App. 2d 27~, 261 N.E. 819
( 1970), the employees in the Animal Care Unit of the
Police Department of Chicago filed a petition for a mandamus to compel the defendant to elevate them to the
same pay scale as patrolmen and requested back salary.
On January 1, 1959, the particular employees were reclassified from a higher grade with a pay equal to that
of the patrolmen to civilian employees at a lower pay
scale than patrolmen. These employees were required
to take the oath, uphold and enforce the laws the
same as were the patrolmen; purchase and wear uniforms similar if not identical to the uniforms worn by
the patrolmen; purchase revolvers and ammunition;
enforce the laws and the city ordinances as well as
exercise powers of arrest the same as the patrolmen;
respond to calls on the police radio and operate police
department equipment and in all other ways perform
the functions and duties of a patrolman assigned to a
special detail. It was further alleged that regularly
classified patrolmen were and had been assigned to the
Animal Care Center and were assigned the same functions and duties as were the plaintiffs with a difference
in pay.
The court held that without actually performing
the identical overall functions of patrolmen they could
not claim the same pay.
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"It is not sufficient that some duties of these
employees coincide with duties of patrolmen if
suc.h duties are only incidental or auxiliary duties
which these employees are required to perform."
Eley v. Cahill, suvra, at page 821.
This was so even though police officers, as part of their
assignment, were assigned to perform the same tasks
and functions as the Animal Care Unit.
"Neither are plaintiffs allegations that regular
patrolmen are occasionally assigned to the Animal Care Unit duties persuasive. The determinative question is not whether regularly classified
patrolmen are assigned to Animal Care Unit
functions but, rather, whether the plaintiffs are,
in fact, assigned to the regular performance of
patrolmen functions." Eley v. Cahill, supra at
page 822.
POINT III
THE ANTI-DISCRIMINATION ACT CONTEMPLATES ONLY A PROSPECTIVE APPLICATION OF THE ACT AND DOES NOT
APPLY TO JOBS WHICH WERE, AT THE
TIME OF THE ENACTMENT OF THE ACT,
ALREADY
CREATED
AND
FILLED;
THEREFORE, THE ACT DOES NOT APPLY
TO THE PLAINTIFF IN THAT THE POSITION SHE OCCUPIED WAS CREATED AND
'VAS FILLED BY HER AT THE TIME OF
THE ENACTMENT OF THE ACT.
Section 34-35-6 (a) , Utah Code Annotated, 1953,
as amended, states that it is a discriminatory or unfair
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employment practice to do certain prohibited acts because of race, color, sex, religion, ancestry or national
origin if the person is "otherwise qualified." The Act
then defines "otherwise qualified" and states that a
person is not "otherwise qualified unless he or she
possesses the education, training, ability, moral character, integrity, disposition to work, adherence to reasonable rules and regulations, and other qualifications
required by an employer for any particular job, job
classification or position to be filled or created." (Em·
phasis added). The words "to be filled or created" are
in the future tense and for that reason it was the clear
intent of the Legislature that this section was to apply
only to jobs, job classifications or positions which were
to be filled or created after the Act was enacted.
The rule of statutory construction is that whenever
reasonably possible effect should be given to every
word, phrase, clause and sentence of a statute. Chez
v. Utah St. Bldg. Comm., 93 Ut. 538, 74 P.2d 687
(1937). A statute should be construed so that effect is
given to all its provisions, so that no part will be inoperative or superfluous, void or insignificant. "The
court should, where possible without adding to or taking
from the language, find the meaning compatible with
reason and sense." Chez v. Utah St. Bldg. Comm., supra,
citing, Robinson v. Union Pacific RR. Co., 70 Ut. 441,
261 P. 9. This is especially true where the meaning
of the words is plain. See Home Building and Loan
Association v. City of Spartanburg, 185 S.C. 313, 194
S.E. 139 (1938); or if a meaning can be reached without
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the elimination of any words. State v. Lundquist, 60
Wash. 2d 397, 374 P.2d 246 ( 1962). The words "to
be filled or created" have a clear and understood meaning and that meaning must be applied to them.
The job, job classification or position in which
Plaintiff was employed was created and was filled by
her prior to the enactment of said act; therefore, the
Act has no application to her.
POINT IV
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION EXCEEDED ITS AUTHORITY AND COMMITTED A
BREACH OF DISCRETION BY AWARDING
BACK-PAY IN THAT THIS IS NOT A CASE
IN WHICH BACK-PAY SHOULD BE A CONSIDERATION.
The Anti-Discrimination Act provides in Section
34-35-7 (12), Utah Code Anrwtated, 1953, as amended:
"If, upon all the evidence at a hearing, the
Commission shall find that a respondent has engaged in or is engaging in, any discriminatory or
unfair employment practice as defined in this
chapter, the Commission shall state its findings
of fact and shall issue and cause to be served
upon such respondent an order requiring such respondent to cease and desist from such discriminatory or unfair employment practice and to
take such affirmative action, including, but not
limited to, hiring, reinstatement, or up-grading o.f
employees, with or without back-pay ... as in the
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judgment of the Commission will effectuate the
purposes of this chapter." (Emphasis added)
The Commission has a right then to up-grade employees
without giving back-pay as well as the granting of
back-pay depending upon the fact situation. In the case
of a municipality the governing body must establish
a budget for each year and cannot vary that budget
without reopening thereof. This matter of budgeting,
setting of salaries, assignment of pay classifications,
and assignment of personnel is a municipal function
and purely a local matter to be established by the local
government officials who are responsible to the citizens.
The Utah Constitution prohibits the delegation of
any municipal function by the Legislature. Article VI,
Section 29, of the Utah Constitution provides:
"The Legislature shall not delegate to any special commission ... any power to make, supervise
or interfere with any municipal improvements,
money, property or effects ... or to perform any
municipal function."
By granting back-pay, the Industrial Commission
is supervising or interfering with municipal money and
is performing a municipal function. This they cannot
do. This court stated in Gord v. Salt Lake City, 20 Ut.
2d 138, 434 P.2d 449 (1967) at page 453:
"The responsibility for the operation of the city
government rests with the City Commission, who
are elected by and responsible to the public."
Arbitrary power or uncontrolled discretion in an administrative agency is generally precluded.
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"It is a fundamental principle or our system of
government that the rights of men are to be determined by the law itself, and not by the let or leave
of administrative agencies, and this principle
ought not to be surrendered for convenience, or in
effect nullified for the sake of expediency."
1 Am.Jur. 2d, Section 108.

A statute which in effect reposes an absolute, unregulated, and undefined discretion in an administrative
agency bestows arbitrary powers and is an unlawful
delegation of legislative power. A.L.A. Schechter
Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 79 L.ed.
1570, 55 S.Ct. 839 ( 1935) ; Eureka City v. Wil,son,
15 Ut. 67, 48 P. 150 ( 1897). The Legislature cannot
vest in an administrative agency the power, in its
absolute or unguided discretion, to apply or withhold
the application of the law, or to say to whom a law
shall or shall not be applied. Walsh v. Dallas R. &
Terminal Co., 140 Tex. 385, 167 S.W.2d 1018.
The legislative authority must set up fixed legal
principles which are to control in given cases by setting
up standards or guide lines to indicate the extent and
prescribe the limits of the discretion which may be exercised under the statutes by the administrative agency.
United States v. Chicago, M.St. P. & P.R. Co., 282
U.S. 311, 75 L.ed. 359; Morgan v. United States, 304
U.S. 1, 82 L.ed. 1129. In fact ,the generally accepted
rule is that a statute which vests an arbitrary discretion
in an administrative agency with reference to the rights
or property of individuals or an ordinarily lawful business or occupation without prescribing a uniform rule
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of action, making the enjoyment of such rights depend
upon arbitrary choice of the agency without reference
to all persons of the class to which the statute is intended
to be applicable and without furnishing any definite
standards or control of the agency, is unconstitutional
and void. Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organization, 307 U.S. 496, 83 L.ed. 1423; Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 30 L.ed. 220. The standards in
conferring discretionary power upon an administrative agency must be reasonably adequate, sufficient,
and definite for the guidance of the agency in the
exercise of power conferred upon it. State v. Marana
Plantations, Inc., 75 Ariz. 111, 252 P.2d 87; Jersey
Maid Mills Products Co. v. Brock, 13 Cal.2d 620, 91
P.2d 577, and must also be sufficient to enable those
affected to know their rights and obligations. United
States v. Rock Royal Cooperative, Inc., 307 U.S. 533,
83 L.ed. 1446. In the statute here in question there
were absolutely no guide lines or standards set to govern
with regards to whether or whether not back-pay should
be awarded. The awarding or withholding of back-pay
was left completely to the discretion of the Commission.
The Commission is further not authorized to grant
solely back-pay as an award for discrimination. The
Statute contemplates that back-pay may be awarded
only in conjunction with other affirmative action, such
as, "hiring, reinstatement, or up-grading of employees."
The up-grading of employees or other affirmative
action must be taken by the Commission upon which
to base the award of back-pay. In the instant case there
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was no affirmative action taken by the Commission
other than an award for back-pay. The Act contemplates the elimination of discrimination and not the
awarding of damages as a matter of right. The Commission did not up-grade the Plaintiff to the position
of Police Officer as a Patrolman 1st, 2nd, 3rd, or 4th
grade and did not place her within any other Civil
Service classification, but merely awarded her back-pay.
This is also not a case for an award of back-pay
since the basic reason for the disparity was not due to
the underpayment of Plaintiff, but assignment of
overqualified police officers within the dispatch office.
The identical question was raised in Mize v. State Division of Human Rights, 328 N.Y.S. 2d 983 (Jan., 1972).
In that case a woman acting as matron in the New
York City jail was performing exactly the same functions as police officers who were acting in the capacity
of "turnkey" (jailers). The Plaintiff in that case performed the same tasks with regard to the female
prisoners as did the police officers with regard to the
male prisoners. The court said, after finding that it was
the same job and that discrimination had occurred, in
regards to the question of back-pay, at page 988:
"The final question is whether the matrons
should be awarded back-pay to August 5, 1968.
The Executive Law provides that the order of
the Commission may provide for the up-grading
of employees, with or without back-pay.... However, no standard is set forth for determining
when back-pay should be awarded. We do not believe that back-pay should be awarded in this in-
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stance, since the basic reason for the disparity in
pay was not the under-payment of the matrons
for the work performed but, rather, the assignment of overqualified personnel to the position of
turnkey. We find that the award of back-pay by
the Commission was an abuse of discretion."
POINTV
THE COURT ERRED IN ORDERING THE
INTERROGATORIES OF PLAINTIFF TO
BE ANSWERED REGARDING SALARIES
OF THE POLICE OFFICERS IN THE DISPATCH OFFICE AND IN BASING THE
AWARD FOR BACK-PAY UPON THOSE INTERROGATORIES.
The Industrial Commission ordered the Defendant
to pay to the Plaintiff, "an amount equaling the difference in salary actually paid her and that paid to a
police officer at the lowest Civil Service grade level,
for the period from July 1, 1965, to January 15, 1970.
Exact amount payable to be determined from Salt Lake
City Corporation payroll records." The District Court
sustained the findings of the Industrial Commission
and upheld its Order, the court used the interrogatories
and erroneously applied the salary of the lowest paid
police officer in the dispatch office. By so doing, the
court arrived at a ridiculous result in that the back-pay
awarded to the Plaintiff fluctuates depending upon
the classification of the police officer working in the dispatch office at that particular period of time. The salary
of the police officer is based upon longevity as well as
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their training and successful passing of tests required
for each position. By this erroneous order, the Plaintiff's
salary fluctuated according to the longevity and promotions of the police officers within the dispatch office,
rather than according to her own longevity. For this
reason, it is respectfully submitted that any award,
if such is granted, should be based upon the salary of
a police officer at the lowest Civil Service grade level,
which is a patrolman fourth grade. These figures are
obtainable from the payroll records of defendant.
POINT VI
AN AWARD FOR BACK-PAY MAY NOT BE
AWARDED BEYOND THE THREE YEAR
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS AND ANY INSTALLMENT BEYOND THAT PERIOD IS
BARRED BY SECTION 78-12-26, UTAH CODE
ANNOTATED, 1953.
In an action alleging discrimination under Section
34-35-7, subparagraph (12), Utah Code Annotated,
1953, as amended, there must be applied a period of
limitation limiting the period for which back pay may
be awarded. The applicable Utah Statutes are Sections
78-12-1 and 78-12-26, Utah Code Annotated, 1953.
These sections, or the applicable portions thereof, are
as follows:
"Civil actions can be commenced only within
the period prescribed in this chapter, after the
cause of action shall have accrued, except where
in special cases a different limitation is prescribed
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by statute. Section 78-12-1, Utah Code Annotated, 1953.
"Within three years:

"(I)***
"(2) ***
"(3) * * *
" ( 4) An action for a liability created by the
statutes of this state other than for a penalty or
forfeiture under the laws of this state, except
where in special cases a different limitation is
prescribed by the statutes of this state." Section 78-12-26, Utah Code Annotated, 1953.
The above statutes of the Utah Code are applicable
sections which must be applied to a claim for back
wages under an action alleging sex discrimination.
There can be no doubt that the purported liability is one
arising under a statute of Utah. The complaint itself
charges that the Plaintiff was discriminated against in
matters of compensation because of sex in violation of
Section 34-35-6, subparagraph ( 1), Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, and that she should be compensated for back pay pursuant to Section 34-35-7,
subparagraph (12), Utah Code Annotated, 1953.
Statutes of limitation are founded upon the general
experience of mankind that claims which are valid
should not be allowed to remain neglected once a person
has a right to sue thereon. Weber v. State Harbor
Comrs., 18 Wall. (U.S.) 57, 21 L.ed. 798 (1873);
Hanger v. Abbott, 6 Wall. (U.S.) 532, 18 L.ed. 939
( 1868) . In order to encourage promptness in bringing
an action, such statutes are enacted to restrict to a fixed
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period of time the claims which might otherwise be
asserted for an unlimited term. Riddles Barger v. Hartford F. Ins. Co., 7 Wall. (U.S.) 386, 19 L.ed. 257
(1869) .The very purpose and object of statutes of limitation is to compel the exercise of a right to action
within a reasonable time. Lamb v. Powder River Livestock Co., 132 F. 434, 67 L.R.A. 558 ( 1904), and to
bring to rest any claim based upon that right. Ashton
Jenkins Co. v. Bramel, 56 Ut. 587, 192 P. 375, 11
A. L. R. 7 52 ( 1920) . If a claim is not asserted within
the prescribed period, then the statute of limitation is
a bar to any recovery based upon that claim.
A principle which is generally resorted to in the
interpretation of statutes of limitation is that a court
may consider reasonableness of the result of a particular construction and the practical effect of the
adoption of a different interpretation. Jennings v.
Lowery and Berry, 147 Miss. 673, 112 So. 692 (1927);
Adams and Freese Co. v. Kenoyer, 17 N.D. 302, 116
N. W. 98 ( 1908) . A ridiculous result could be reached
in the case of back pay if no statute of limitation were
applied. An employee could work on a job for 20 or
30 years without any complaint or without any request
for additional pay and then bankrupt an employer with
a claim for back wages for all of those years based upon
a claim of discrimination.
That the case at bar is an action for a liability created
by the statutes of this state cannot be disputed. A
liability created by a statute is a liability which would
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not exist but for the statute. Houg v. Haug, 206 Oki.
179, 242 P.2d 162 (1952); Smith Eng. Works v. Custer,
194 Oki. 318, 151 P. 2d 404 (1944).

It has been held that the statutory claims limitation

period limiting an action created by a statute applies
to claims for back wages where the claim was for overtime compensation under the 1'-.air Labor Standards
Act, 29 U.S.C.A., Sections 201-219, Abram v. Sam
Joaquin Cotton Oil Co., (D.C. Cal.) 46 F. Supp. 969
(1942); Lorenzetti v. American Trust Co., (D.C. Cal.),
45 F. Supp. 128 (1942). The same limitation period
also applies to the liability of an employer for injuries
sustained by an employee, under the New York State
Labor Law, Smith v. Onondaga Pottery Co., 300
N.Y.S. 298, 164 Miss. 883 (1937). It has likewise been
applied to actions brought under the Utah State Workman's Compensation Law, Utah Const. Min. Co. v.
Industrial Comm., 57 Ut. 279, 194 P. 657 (1920). In
Romer v. Leary, 428 F. 2d 186 ( 1970), the Second
Circuit Court of. Appeals for the Southern District of
New York held that where a policeman was discharged
in 1963 for refusing to waive immunity from prosecution when he was called to testify before the Grand
Jury, and where the action was not commenced until
1968, such claim is governed by the three year statute
of limitation provided for suits "to recover upon a liability created or imposed by statute." In that case, the
court, at Page 187, stated:
"It is now settled by Swan v, Board of Higher
Education (2nd Cir. 1963) 319 F. 2d 56, that a
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suit seeking a declaratory for injunctive relief
which is based on the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C.
1983, the applicable limitation in a case arising in
New York, is the three year limitation now provided for suits to 'recover upon the liability ...
created or imposed by statute' ... that the present
case seeking reinstatement and back pay, is cast
in declaratory judgment form does not attract to
it the six year statute that the state court would
apply to an action commenced under the state
declaratory judgment law. Cplr., Section 3001."
The next question which arises is when does the
period of limitation in the present case begin to run?
The prescribed statute of limitation period runs from
the time the action accrues, i.e., when the plaintiff has
a right of action and when there is a remedy available.
West v. Theis, 15 Id. 167, 96 P. 932 (1908); Bruner
v. Martin, 76 Kan. 862, 93 P. 165 (1907); Jrmne v.
Bossen, 25 Cal. 2d 652,156 P.2d 9 (1944). The rule
is that the right of action accrues whenever a wrong
has been sustained as will give a right to bring and
sustain a suit. Aachen & N.F. Ins. Co. v. Morton,
(C.C.A 6th) 156 F. 654, 15 L.R.A. (N.S.) 156 ( 1907).
An installment of periodic payment is a continual one,
and any limitation on the right to sue for each installment necessarily commences to run from the time that
each installment actually falls due. Abbott v. City of
Los Angeles, 50 Cal.2d 438, 326 P.2d 484 (1958);
Buell v. Duchesne Mercantile Co., 64 Ut. 391, 231 P.
123 (1924).
This principle has been applied against rental
installments and held the right of action accrues on each
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installment when that installment becomes due and any
past due installments beyond the period prescribed by
the statute of limitation are barred. Tillson v. Peters,
41 Cal.App.2d 671 ( 1941), 107 P.2d 434. Likewise,
when payments are due in installments for payment
under a judgment for child support, any installments
beyond the statute of limitation are barred. Leonard
v. Kleitz, 155 Kan. 626, 127 P .2d 421 ( 1942). When
a note is payable in installments, the statute begins to
run against each installment when that installment becomes due and payable. Buckman v. Hill Military
Academy, 182 Ore. 621, 189 P.2d 575. When the
question arose as to what period of limitation should
be applied to additional back-pay under a pension payment program, the court in Abbott v. City of Los
Angeles, supra, at page 498, stated:
"As indicated in Martin v. Hendrickson, 40
Cal.2d 583, 593, 225 P.2d 416 ( 1953), the rule is,
however that the availability for an action for declaratory relief in no way affects the period of
limitations commencing upon the breach of an
obligation to pay money. Neither is the right to
declaratory relief with respect to the obligation
to make payments which fall within the limitations barred .... Here, as we have seen, the statutory time limitation upon the right to sue for each
pension and installment commences to run from
the time when that installment falls due. It follows that even though plaintiffs might have
earlier brought suit for declaratory relief .. ., their
failure to do so does not operate to bar this right
to declaratory relief with respect to future pension payments, as well as the monetary judgment
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for the difference, for three years .... In Dillon
v. Board of Pension Com'rs., 18 Cal.2d 427, 431432, 116 P.2d 37, 136 A.L.R. 800 (1941); ...
this court declared.... 'If the pension is granted,
he is entitled to receive payments in the future,
but can recover only those past payments which
would have accrued within a period of six months
prior to the time of the making of the claim.' "
In Buell v. Duchesne Mercantile Co., supra, at page
124, the court said:
"The authorities seem to be overwhelmingly in
favor of the claim made by respondent that,
'When a judgment is rendered payable in installments, the statute of limitations begins to run
against it from the time fixed for the payment of
each installment for the part then payable.' 23
Cyc. 1510. Respondent has cited the following
authorities supporting the general rule of law
contained in the above quotation.''
The court then cited several cases.
Since wages are a periodic payment falling due
upon each payday, wages beyond the period of limitation are barred by the statute of limitation. Fry v.
Board of Education, 17 Cal.2d 753, 112 P.2d 229
(1941). Roseborough v. Shasta River Canal Co., 22
Cal.App. 556; Raymond v. Christian, 24 Cal. App.2d
92, 74 P.2d 536 (1937). The limitation statute which
is applicable to an action for salary begins to run against
each installment of salary as soon as it is due. Craw/ord
v. Hunt, 41 Ariz., 229, 17 P.2d 802 (1932). Hence, in
the case at bar, the Plaintiff could not recover for back
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wages for a period of more than three years prior to
the commencement of this action.

CONCLUSION
The intent of the Utah Legislature was not to
allow claims of discrimination every time a male and
a female perform some of the same tasks, but was to
provide for equal treatment of an employee by an
employer. Unless the female is performing the same
job there is no basis for discrimination. In the case
before the bar, the plaintiff performed the same tasks
as the men only on occasion and this does not constitute
the same job, job classification or position to be filled
or created. U nler the ~,ederal Act, it has been decided
that even though men and women perform the same
identical tasks 90% of the time this does not constitute
the same job. In the case at hand the plaintiff did not
perform the same tasks any where near this amount of
time.
The Legislature also intended that the Act apply
only to jobs, job classifications and positions which were
to be created or filled in the future so that discrimination
might be eliminated over a period of time. Thus, the
Act was not to have a retroactive effect.
The plaintiff did not possess the qualifications
which were possessed by the police officers and did not
have the training, education or ability which the police
officers had and which were required of them by the
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defendant. One cannot claim equal pay unless he or
she meets all qualifications required by an employer.
Even in the event there was discrimination and the
discrimination had as its sole basis sex, there are three
reasons why this case is not one requiring back pay.
( 1) The plaintiff was not underpaid for the job she
performed, but the men with whom she was working
were over-qualified in their assignment in the dispatch
off ice. ( 2) The Commission could not grant back pay
without up-grading the plaintiff, because the Act was
not established for the purpose of fining or penalizing
an offender, but for the purpose of eliminating discrimination. The elimination of discrimination must
be accomplished by an up-grading of the employee which
in this case was not done. ( 3) An administrative agency
cannot, because of the restrictions imposed by the Utah
Constitution, perform a municipal function nor can
it interfere with or supervise money or property of a
municipality.
In the event an award for back pay is granted, it
should be the clifference between the salary paid plaintiff and that of a patrolman at the lowest Civil Service
classification and not the difference between that paid
the plaintiff and that of higher classified police officers
working in the dispatch office. No person's salary should
be allowed to fluctuate depending upon the longevity
and promotions of another with whom they work.
Lastly, there must be a period of limitation applied
to any award for back pay and the period in this case
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is three years as provided by the Utah statute. The
statute of limitation operates as a bar against any installment due prior to three years from the filing of
the complaint.
Respectfully submitted,

0. WALLACE EARL
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